

Message Text

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ACTION INR-05

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSO-00 EA-06 PM-03 NSCE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6280

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MANILA 16038

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (EO, TAGS, SUBJECT ADDED)

EO 11652: XGDS-2, 3

TAGS: MARR, PINT, SHUM, RP

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND STUDY FOR PHILIPPINE BASE NEGOTIATIONS

REFS: (A) MANILA 13798; (B) MANILA 14548; (C) MANILA 15267;
(D) STATE 234468

1. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW. WE HAVE REVIEWED FACTORS CURRENTLY
WEIGHING UPON MARCOS FOR CONTINUITY AND FOR CHANGE IN HIS
TACTICS, TIMING AND OBJECTIVES IN NEGOTIATIONS. ESSENTIAL
UNCERTAINTIES ARE (A) HOW FAR MARCOS THINKS HE CAN GO
TOWARD EASING CONTROLS WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HIS DOMESTIC
POSITION, AND (B) WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE
CONGRESS DEMAND FROM HIM CONCERNING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
AND EXPECT FROM HIM AS REGARDS POLITICAL NORMALIZATION HE WANTS.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MARCCOS PROBABLY WILL WANT TO
KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN. FOR REGIONAL, DOMESTIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, MARCCOS WANTS THE BASES TO REMAIN
AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. AT THE SAME TIME,
MARCOS ALSO WANTS MORE SPECIFIC SECURITY UNDERSTANDINGS,
ESPECIALLY CONCERNING COMPENSATION TO MEET DIRECTLY OR
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INDIRECTLY HIS PERCEIVED MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

MARCOS MAY WELL BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT HOW BEST TO
PROCEED GIVEN THE FOR HIM PUZZLING HUMAN RIGHTS FACTOR.
HE PROBABLY WILL NOT PUSH HIS REQUIREMENTS UNTIL ASSURED
(PREFERABLY BY US) THAT THE SETTING IS RIGHT. HE WILL
CONTINUE TO EXPERIMENT CAUTIOUSLY WITH SO-CALLED
POLITICAL NORMALIZATION IN HOPES THEREBY OF IMPROVING

HIS IMAGE AND ASSISTANCE PROSPECTS. HE WILL NOT KNOWINGLY CARRY THE NORMALIZATION PROCESS TO THE POINT OF JEOPARDIZING HIS DOMESTIC POSITION. IN THIS REGARD, DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE MUSLIM INSURRECTION, NPA DISSIDENCE, STUDENT UNREST, AND PEACE AND ORDER GENERALLY WILL BE SIGNIFICANT. HE STILL MAY NOT APPRECIATE THAT ANY EVOLUTION IN CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTION WILL TAKE TIME, EVEN GIVEN SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS ON HIS PART.

WITHIN THIS SETTING, THE U.S. AND GOP HAVE JOINTLY FORMALIZED PROCEDURES FOR ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS() AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL (AMBASSADOR NEWSOM AND AS MANY DIRECT CONTACTS AS MARCOS CAN ARRANGE WITH THE ADMINISTRATION), AND (B) AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL TO RESOLVE PRESSING MUTUAL CONCERNS AT THE BASES. DIALOGUE AT THESE LEVELS WILL OF COURSE ALSO INFLUENCE THE TIMING, TACTICS, AND EVEN OBJECTIVES THAT MARCOS MAY PURSUE. IF WE ARE RESPONSIVE IN DISCUSSING THE POLICY ISSUES, WHILE WORKING EFFECTIVELY TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, WE MAY SATISFY MARCOS FOR THE NEAR TERM, AND EVEN BEYOND IF ADEQUATE COMPENSATION IS PROVIDED. A FORMAL AGREEMENT COULD CAP THIS PROCESS. IN ANY EVENT, THE UNDERSTANDINGS EFFECTED WITHIN THE TWO-TIERED DIALOGUE WOULD PUT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE ON A FIRMER FOOTING. INTERMITTENT NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE PAST 30 YEARS COULD WELL CONTINUE SO LONG AS U.S. FORCES REMAIN IN THE PHILIPPINES. SOME SUCH "PAY AS WE GO-
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CONTINUING ATTENTION TO PHILIPPINE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND OUR AND THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AT THE BASES MAY BE THE NAME OF THE GAME FOR SOME TIME TO COME. END SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW.

2. FACTORS FOR CONTINUITY. MARCOS REMAINS MINDFUL OF THE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE US-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP-- SECURITY, TRADE, INVESTMENT AND A PSYCHOLOGICAL LINKAGE IMPORTANT TO HIS DOMESTIC POSITION AND COMFORTING TO HIS INSTINCTS. MARCOS CONTINUES TO VIEW THE BASES AS A TANGIBLE GUARANTEE OF A CONTINUING US STAKE IN PHILIPPINE SECURITY. HE PROBABLY ALSO SEES THE BASES AS A REASSURING SYMBOL TO FOREIGN BUSINESS INTERESTED IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT HERE, AND AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF EMPLOYMENT AND HARD CURRENCY. REGIONALLY, MARCOS IS ENCOURAGED BY ASEAN, JAPAN AND THE PRC NOT TO DISTURB OUR PRESENCE. DOMESTICALLY, MOST FILIPINOS REMAIN PRO-

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AMERICAN. MARCOS SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE THAT A SHARP BREAK
WITH THE US ON SUCH A MAJOR ISSUE AS THE BASES COULD CAUSE
A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS DOMESTIC REACTION.

MARCOS' PERSONAL STYLE IS ALSO A FACTOR FOR
CONTINUITY. HE IS CAUTIOUS, PRAGMATIC AND NOT GIVEN TO
MAJOR INNOVATION. HIS BACKGROUND AND AGE ALSO WEIGH
AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. HE MAY TRY TO DISGUISE THE
BIAS, BUT HE IS PERSONALLY ATTRACTED TO AMERICANS,
PROBABLY BECAUSE OF HIS WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCES. AT
AGE 60, HIS PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD IS WELL ESTABLISHED.
HE HARBORS DEEP DISTRUST OF THE SOVIETS IN PARTICULAR
AND COMMUNISTS IN GENERAL. HE LOOKS TO PROSPECT
OF A THIRD WORLD ROLE WITH INTEREST BUT WITH CAUTION
AS TO THE CONCRETE BENEFITS.

3. FACTORS FOR CHANGE.

A. UNCERTAIN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. MARCOS DISLIKES
LIVING WITH THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTY OF HOW THE US
RELATES TO HIM AND TO HIS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. HE
WANTS MORE THE RHETORICAL REASSURANCES ON OUR GENERAL
SECURITY COMMITMENT AND OUR SPECIFIC SUPPORT FOR HIS
MILITARY NEEDS. HE SEEMS TO KNOW THAT HE CANNOT EXPECT
MUCH MORE FROM US UNDER THE MDT. BUT HE MAY WONDER

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WHETHER HIS CRITICIZED HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IN PARTICULAR,
AND THE UNCLEAR DIRECTION OF CONGRESSIONAL THINKING ON
US SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN GENERAL, MAY MEAN THAT HE MUST
NOW EXPECT LESS. HE IS CLEVERLY SEEKING GREATER DEFINITION

THROUGH THE SECURITY ASSURANCE/MILITARY ASSISTANCE EQUATION HE SKETCHED FOR HOLBROOKE (PARA 2A OF REF C). HE LOOKS TO AN EARLY PROCESS OF "JOINT DEFENSE/PLANNING" TO TEST OUR INTENTIONS. BEHIND THIS EQUATION, MARCOS RESENTS BEING PUSHED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND IS DISTURBED BY THE IMPLICATION THAT HIS RECENT HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC AND ACTION ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DISCOUNTED. HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW FAR HE MUST (OR PERHAPS CAN) GO TO SATISFY OUR EXPECTATIONS. HE WOULD LIKE CLEARER DEFINITION OF WHAT HE IS LIKELY TO GET FROM US FOR UNDERGOING THE RISKS HE THINKS WE WANT HIM TO TAKE. A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS HIS CONCERN ABOUT SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY. THE AFP EXPECTS MAJOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE (AS MUCH AS \$200 MILLION ANNUALLY) TO COME OUT OF BASE NEGOTIATIONS. DETAILED PLANS ON HOW TO SPEND THE MONEY HAVE TENDED TO PUT MILITARY APPETITES ON EDGE. THIS IS A PROBLEM FOR MARCOS BUT, AS WE INDICATE IN PARA 4B BELOW, ONE WE BELIEVE HE CAN MANAGE.

B. FINANCIAL ASPECTS. THE COMPENSATION ISSUE RELATES TO THE CONDITION OF THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY WHICH, IN THE ABSENCE OF OUTSIDE HELP, MUST FUND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS MOST ECONOMIC INDICATORS ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC, NOT FORGETTING THE EVER PRESENT DEBT SERVICE QUESTIONS THAT EXIST FOR MOST NON-OIL LDCS. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT IN SPITE OF STEADILY RISING DEBT SERVICE REQUIREMENTS, MANAGEMENT AND CAPACITY TO PAY SHOULD REMAIN SATISFACTORY. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS THE DEBT SERVICE RATIO WILL BE IN THE RANGE OF 20

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PERCENT. ANY ADDITIONS TO THE DEBT SERVICE BURDEN WOULD COMPLICATE AN ALREADY DIFFICULT SITUATION. TO THE EXTENT THAT MARCOS REGARDS THIS AREA AS A PROBLEM, HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMEMBER THAT IT IS CHEAPER TO BUY MILITARY HARDWARE FROM US THAN ELSEWHERE.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS. MARCOS IS IRRITATED AND UNSETTLED ABOUT THE PRESSURES TO RELAX HIS STRUCTURE OF CONTROL. HE SEEMS TO BE TRYING TO MAKE THE MOST OF A BAD SITUATION BY LINKING THE PACE OF POLITICAL NORMALIZATION WITH THE PACE OF BASE NEGOTIATIONS. HE TELLS US THAT THERE MUST BE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO THAT NATIONALISTIC POLITICIANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO USE THE BASES AGAINST HIM IN A NORMALIZED POLITICAL SETTING. HE HAS GONE SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT IF A NEW BASE AGREEMENT IS NOT WRAPPED UP BEFORE THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE BECOMES ACTIVE, HE CAN GIVE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE AGREEMENT WILL BE QUICKLY APPROVED. THIS IS ALL VERY ARTFUL BUT FOR OTHER REASONS WE QUESTION THAT MARCOS WOULD EVER GO SO FAR IN THE SO-CALLED NORMALIZATION PROCESS TO RISK HIS

POSITION.

D. OPPOSITION. MARCOS REMAINS SENSITIVE TO CHARGES
AT HOME AND ABROAD THAT HE IS AMERICA'S BOY. HE WANTS
A BROADER FOREIGN POLICY AND MORE RESPECT IN NON-ALIGNED

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COUNCILS. BUT NOT AT THE RISK OF UPSETTING A SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP WHICH, FOR ALL ITS PERCEIVED FAULTS, IS THE
BEST HE HAS AND WHICH RELATES SIGNIFICANTLY TO HIS
DOMESTIC POSITION. WE ARE NOT IMPRESSED WHEN MARCOS SAYS
HE MUST MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASES TO FORESTALL TROUBLE
FROM THE OPPOSITION. HIS RECORD UNDERSCORES THE UNLIKELIHOOD
THAT HE WILL EVER GIVE HIS OPPONENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
ENOUGH ELBOW ROOM TO CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS ON SUCH AN
IMPORTANT ISSUE. HE ALSO IS PROBABLY AWARE THAT
OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND ATTENTIVE FILIPINOS GENERALLY
ARE HEARTENED BY THEIR PERCEPTION THAT THE US IS APPLYING
EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON HIM IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD
BROADLY DEFINED TO INCLUDE POLITICAL RIGHTS AS WELL AS
INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON. IN THIS REGARD, FORMER VICE
PRESIDENT AND NEGOTIATING PANEL MEMBER PELAEZ, WHO WAS
PRESENT DURING HOLBROOKE'S FORMAL PRESENTATION TO MARCOS,
SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK THE CHARGE ASIDE TO EXPRESS HIS GRATIFICA-
TION WITH THE FIRM POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TAKEN BY
HOLBROOKE, AND TO ADVISE THAT " YOU KEEP THE PRESSURE
ON MARCOS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WE'LL HELP YOU ON
THE BASES."

4. PROSPECTS.

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A. BASES, HUMAN RIGHTS, NORMALIZATION. MARCOS WILL PROBABLY PREFER TO KEEP HIS OPTIONS OPEN IN THIS UNCERTAIN SETTING. WE BELIEVE HE WANTS THE BASES TO STAY AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, PROBABLY LONGER. HE WILL WANT AS SOON AS HE CAN GET IT, A MORE DEFINED SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH US. HE PROBABLY DOES NOT EXPECT MUCH MORE FROM THE MDT BUT WOULD LIKE US TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS LIMITATIONS BY PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO COVER HIS MILITARY SUPPLY NEEDS. HE SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS WE WOULD HAVE IN THIS AND WILL LIKELY GIVE US TIME AND FLEXIBILITY TO RESOLVE THEM. HOWEVER, MARCOS WILL NOT WANT TO COAST AND HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THIS ISSUE CLEARED UP SO HE COULD CONCENTRATE ON OTHER THINGS. HE WILL BE LOOKING TO EARLY FEEDBACK ON HOW SENATE AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS REACT TO THE SECURITY NEEDS HE SKETCHED FOR US (REF C).

IN THE MEANTIME, WE CAN EXPECT MARCOS TO REMAIN CAUTIOUS IN FURTHER EFFORTS TO LOOSEN HIS REGIME. HE MAY EASE JP IN CERTAIN AREAS, HOPING THAT WITH THE RIGHT PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT. HE WILL PICK UP COUNTERS WITH THE

ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS. (HE ALSO MAY CAST SOME TENTATIVE LINES TO THE SOVIETS ET AL AND TO THE PRC IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW US HE HAS OPTIONS, BUT HIS HEART WILL NOT BE IN IT AND HE WILL PROBABLY NOT FOLLOW THROUGH.) HE WILL BE ATTENTIVE TO THE DOMESTIC PROBLEM AREAS-- MINDANAO, WHERE THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR RESUMED FIGHTING; THE NPA, WHICH APPEARS TO BE GROWING IN STRENGTH AND ENERGY; THE STUDENTS, WHO SHOW SIGNS OF INCREASED RESTIVENESS; AND CRIME, WHICH MAY BE PICKING UP AFTER THE LIFTING OF CURFEW. WE CAN EXPECT HIM TO SEEK MAXIMUM CREDIT FOR EVERY STEP HE DOES TAKE, HOWEVER MODEST, AND TO ARRANGE AS MUCH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF

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THE ADMINISTRATION AND WITH THE CONGRESS AS POSSIBLE.

THAT A DIALOGUE IS UNDERWAY CAN BE USEFUL TO MARCOS IN EVIDENCING VIS-A-VIS DOMESTIC OPPOSITION BOTH HIS CONTINUING CONCERN FOR PHILIPPINE SOVEREIGNTY AND HIS ACCEPTABILITY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE MARCS OPPOSITION IN THE US IS MORE TROUBLESOME BECAUSE OF THE INFLUENCE IT COULD HAVE ON CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION. HE PROBABLY REALIZES THERE IS LITTLE HE CAN DO, SHORT OF BASIC REFORMS AND FREE AND OPEN ELECTIONS, TO SATISFY THEM. THUS HE PROBABLY WILL CONCENTRATE ON PRESENTING

HIS STORY MORE EFFECTIVELY WHERE IT WILL DO THE MOST GOOD.

IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO PURSUE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GOOD FAITH, WITH THE HOPE THAT MARCOS WILL NORMALIZE APACE. HE DOESN'T LIKE IT BUT HE KNOWS THAT HIS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AS PERCEIVED BY CONGRESS, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, CAN BE DECISIVE TO THE ASSURANCES AND THE COMPENSATION HE WANTS. HIS DILEMMA IS THAT DETERMINED PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS MAY UNDERMINE HIS POWER POSITION. OUR DILEMMA IS THAT ANY RELAXATION OF OUR ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAY SIGNAL TO HIM THAT HE HAS MADE THE GRADE. UNSETTLING IS

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THAT MARCOS MAY HAVE CHOSEN TO RELY MORE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS THAN ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCE IN THIS CRITICAL FIELD.

B. COMPENSATION AND THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY.
THE SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COMPENSATION PACKAGE REMAIN KEY TO THE RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES. MARCOS STRESSES A MULTI-YEAR COMMITMENT FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION PLUS PROVISION FOR EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS. THE EXPECTATIONS WHICH THE AFP HAS FOR COMPENSATION IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR MARCOS, BUT ONE WE BELIEVE HE CAN CONTROL. EVEN THOUGH THE AFP IS AMONG THE PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF THE PHILIPPINE POWER STRUCTURE, ITS LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REMAIN SUBSERVIENT TO MARCOS, EVEN ON THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLY. MARCOS HAS ALWAYS SEEN TO THE NEEDS OF THE MILITARY, BOTH PROFESSIONAL AND

PERSONAL, AND PRESUMABLY HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. MORE NATIONALISTIC COLONELS ARE PUSHING IN THE WINGS, BUT MARCOS IS UNLIKELY TO PERMIT LEADERSHIP CHANGES WHICH MIGHT CAUSE HIM PROBLEMS. HE CAN LIKELY CONTINUE TO HANDLE HIS MILITARY, INCLUDING THE SPECIAL STUDIES GROUP, WITH OR WITHOUT AN EARLY COMPENSATION PACKAGE THROUGH BASE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT, OVER TIME, THE COLONELS MAY GAIN A LARGER VOICE AND PRESS FOR
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MORE ACCESS TO BASE OPERATIONS THAN THE OLD GUARD UNDER CHIEF OF STAFF ESPINO. THERE IS LITTLE WE CAN DO ABOUT THIS SPECIFIC PROSPECT OTHER THAN POSSIBLY ATTENUATE OVERALL AFP PRESSURES BY ASSISTING WITH IMMEDIATE, JUSTIFIABLE MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS THROUGH EXISTING MAP AND FMS MECHANISMS.

FOR THE OVERALL ISSUE OF COMPENSATION, WE BELIEVE THAT GIVEN A BASE OF CONTINUING US PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES IN AN ANNUAL MAGNITUDE OF \$500 MILLION, MARCOS WOULD THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT AN ADD-ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE AMOUNTING TO AROUND \$50 MILLION ANNUALLY WHICH COULD FREE GOP BUDGET FUNDS FOR THE AFP. THE PROSPECT OF HIM ACCEPTING SUCH A PACKAGE WOULD BE HELPED BY CONTINUING MAP AT \$15-20 MILLION ANNUALLY, FMS CREDIT AT \$30 MILLION ANNUALLY AND TRAINING AT \$2 MILLION. WHATEVER THE COMPOSITION OF SUCH PACKAGE, MARCOS WILL NOT PUSH FOR IT UNTIL HE CONCLUDES THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL ARE GOOD.

IN DISCUSSION WITH HOLBROOKE, MARCOS SHOWED FLEXIBILITY IN MOVING DIFFICULT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, E.G., CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, DOWN FROM THE SENSITIVE CATEGORY OF ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY. IN MARCOS' MIND THIS PRESUPPOSES A WILLINGNESS ON OUR PART TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT EFFORTS TO MEET PHILIPPINE CONCERNS IN THESE AREAS. IT ALSO PRESUPPOSES AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO HIS REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPENSATION. IF WE COULD ASSURE MARCOS OF A PACKAGE ALONG LINES OUTLINED ABOVE, REAFFIRM OUR MDT COMMITMENT WITH NO MORE THAN THE EMBELLISHMENT OFFERED IN OUR DRAFT AIDE MEMOIRE ("PACIFIC AREA"), AND COME FORTH WITH AN IMAGINATIVE FORMULATION ON DUTY CERTIFICATE PROCEDURES, WE WOULD BE CLOSE TO A WORK-ABLE UNDERSTANDING, OR FORMAL AGREEMENT IF INDICATED.

C. ONGOING PROCESS. MARCOS PROBABLY EXPECTS THE
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CURRENT SITUATION TO CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME ALTHOUGH

HE MAY OVERESTIMATE HIS ABILITY TO ALTER THE IMAGE OF
HIS REGIME IN WASHINGTON THROUGH HIGHLY PUBLICIZED
RATHER INSUBSTANTIAL MEASURES. HE RECOGNIZES THE
UNCERTAINTIES IN PUSHING FOR AN EARLY RESOLUTION AND IS
PRESUMABLY READY TO PURSUE THE TWO-TIERED DIALOGUE REVIEWED
IN REF C. THAT PROCESS IN ITSELF MAY BE SUFFICIENT FOR
MARCOS' CURRENT REQUIREMENTS TO SHOW DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
OBSERVERS THAT HE IS TENDING TO THE NEEDS OF PHILIPPINE
SOVEREIGNTY. THE CURRENT TASK FORCE OPERATION TO RESOLVE
IRRITANTS AT THE BASES BEFORE THEY BECOME SERIOUS EMOTIONAL
ISSUES ALSO MAY BE USEFUL IN MAKING THIS POINT. IN THE
MEANTIME MARCOS WILL BE PUSHING OUR WILLINGNESS AND OUR
ABILITY TO DELIVER THE ASSURANCES AND COMPENSATION HE
WANTS.
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Message Attributes

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